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(Un)Reasonable, (Un)Necessary, and 
(In)Appropriate 
Biographic Mediation of Neurodivergence in 
Academic Accommodations
Aimée Morrison
At forty-four, I was diagnosed with autism and with attention-deficit/hyperactivity 
disorder (ADHD) (inattentive type). My emerging interest in disability studies—
part of my ongoing research into social justice activism in personal online life narra-
tives and collective action through social media—suddenly became more 
personally salient than expected. Since then, I have, sometimes tentatively and 
sometimes confidently, begun to explore and assert my identity as a disabled schol-
ar on academic and public Twitter, in closed-membership Facebook groups for 
adults with ADHD and for women with autism, in person among friends, and in 
public in the context of advocating for accommodations for my autistic daughter 
and against ableism more generally. I have even spoken about my diagnosis on 
national radio.1 And yet. I have not disclosed my disability formally at work, even 
though I know I have legal entitlement to accommodations that would surely miti-
gate some of the pronounced difficulties I experience in my work as a tenured facul-
ty member.
I was already puzzling over this hesitation when the call for papers for this 
issue appeared in my inbox. In that call, as in her article on the topic, Ebony Coletu 
describes “biographic mediation” as “any institutional demand for personal disclo-
sure to make decisions about who gets what and why” (“Biographic Mediation” 
384). It struck me that the “biographic mediation” of disability experience, identi-
ty, and rights entailed in securing workplace accommodation as a faculty member 
was exactly at the heart of my hesitation: the formal structures of disclosure and 
accommodation in institutions of higher education enact precisely the demand and 
both provoke and suppress the critiques that Coletu identifies. The question of 
“who gets what and why” often presents itself as an implicit or explicit complaint 
that necessarily puts the institution and the individual into conflict (Ahmed). After 
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all, the twin bureaucratic regimes of disability diagnosis and academic workplace 
accommodation are geared toward managing (i.e., limiting, as we will see) demands 
for access. No disabled person goes to the substantial and costly trouble of submit-
ting to evaluative processes in different medical and bureaucratic contexts, of secur-
ing and deploying diagnostic paperwork, if they are not seeking to circumvent an 
obstacle impeding their full and equitable participation in the workplace. No uni-
versity goes to the substantial and costly trouble of setting up elaborate special 
offices, paperwork, standards of practice, staff complements, handouts, mandatory 
trainings, and high-level policies unless it is seeking to limit some combination of 
legal, financial, and sometimes social liability. 
Attention to the forms and practices by which biographic mediation is enacted 
can show, Coletu asserts, “emerging patterns and tactics of governance, reform, and 
resistance” (“Call for Papers”). Biographic mediation of disability through accom-
modations bureaucracies in the academic workplace attempts to contain and con-
trol difference in such a way as to leave intact the fundamentally ableist set of values, 
practices, and built environments that constitute the institution known as “the uni-
versity.” The main sites of biographic mediation of disability in the academic work-
place are diagnosis, the formalized processes of disclosure and verification in the 
university accessibility bureaucracy, and the enactment and framing of any granted 
accommodation. Each site is the ground for battles over agency enacted through the 
solicitation, management, and framing of disabled life stories. Ultimately, what is at 
stake in the biographic mediation of disability in the academy is not so much 
whether the provision of extra administrative assistance or noise-mitigating equip-
ment is affordable. It is, instead, this: what do disabled lives mean? The model of aca-
demic accommodations fundamentally frames disability as a set of (tragic, 
pathological) medical characteristics that impair “otherwise qualified” (that is to 
say, able) individuals, who are entitled to “reasonable,” “necessary,” and “appropriate” 
special arrangements within their educational or workplace environments as set 
out in law. By contrast, disability activism demands a more thoroughgoing rethink-
ing of the ableist character of higher education more generally, with a view to creat-
ing a truly accessible university that ontologically and routinely makes space for, 
incorporates, and celebrates difference as a basic condition of all social, education-
al, and work spaces. This is the challenge that biographic mediation of disability in 
academic accommodations seeks to contain.
Disability identity itself is rooted in story. It is called into being through the 
reports and case studies produced by doctors, therapists, and assessors of all sorts 
that culminate in a diagnosis. It is re-produced in the stories that must be framed in 
order to secure necessary mechanisms of access to workplaces, public spaces, and 
education, while diminishing occasions for humiliation and loss of dignity. Finally, 
disability identity also offers the potentially radical opportunity for rewriting a life 
story in the face of a new diagnosis. Life narratives of disability can be articulated in 
medical, bureaucratic, or vernacular languages; biographically or auto/
biographically; and for audiences comprising the self, family, insurance companies, 
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educational professionals, therapists, employers, or the public more generally. The 
available languages and cultural framings attached to disability—“symptoms,” 
“impairments,” “difference,” “functional limitations,” “tragedy,” “inspiration,” “over-
coming”—offer sometimes contradictory material for the construction of disabili-
ty as a social fact, or as an autobiographical one. Disabled life narrative is thus prey 
to biographic mediations of all sorts, at every level, inescapably. Stephanie 
Kerschbaum writes, “Because disability is such a contested site for identity perfor-
mance, it remains a challenging area in which to construct identity claims that are 
recognized by audiences” (57). This question of being recognized by audiences is 
often at the core of conflicts over the biographic mediation of disability. What 
became immediately clear in my own case, as in others, was how fuzzy, how narra-
tive, and how contextual diagnoses of disability can be. For example, one of the 
diagnostic criteria of autism is the idea that other people find me weird, as based on 
observational reports. Indeed, the assessment process is nearly entirely narrative 
and relational, and the diagnosis itself is presented in the form of a short biography 
written by the psychologist, a “report” enframing the newly diagnosed person’s life 
story (my life story) in a set of medicalized, formal diagnostic criteria. My mother, 
for example, was asked to report on whether her pregnancy with me was “normal” 
and whether I had any friends as a child. My husband was asked to comment on my 
emotional selfishness and love of routine, as well as my deep need to find fairness 
and reason in the world. The assessor herself performed structured tests of my abil-
ity to converse appropriately (eye contact, turn-taking, topic shifting) without let-
ting me know exactly what she was assessing, or how, in order to catch me unaware 
—unselfconscious.2 Diagnosis gave me the impression that everyone got to talk 
about me except me. 
This feeling of narrative erasure is common. Ian Hacking thus proposes a dis-
crete genre of “autistic narrative,” from which he excludes clinical reports, policy 
documents, and other medical writing, an exclusion meant to support autistic 
self-determination at the same time as it recognizes the violence, both rhetorical 
and material, that medical science and institutional modes of knowing have enact-
ed on autistic people since the disorder was first elaborated in the 1940s. Ann 
McGuire, however, critiques this move, well-meaning as it might be, arguing that 
such exclusions fail to truly account for the deterministic power of the latter kind of 
writing on the social construction of autism as well as the life chances of autistic 
people (11). In addition to observations and interviews, during my assessment I 
also completed a surprising number and variety of Likert-scale tests, quantifying 
my character, preferences, and experiences. I remember this as a deeply moving 
experience, as I recognized parts of myself that had never been named before (“If 
someone cancels a plan, my whole day is ruined”). It was also frustrating because 
many of the questions did not seem to be addressed to me, or not in the right way: 
“I am often more interested in objects than people” (it depends which objects or 
which people); “People often seem insulted by things that I say” (Yes, but some of 
my job requires assessing and managing others, so isn’t that more occupational 
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than neurological?). In some profound ways, these tests, alongside the structured 
interviews with the assessor, “taught” me how my enactment of self-produced 
“autistic resonances” would allow others to see me—and for me to learn to see 
myself—as autistic (Yergeau 193). That is to say: there is certainly no part of my 
own disabilities that is not always already thoroughly biographically mediated, not 
least by the assessment process leading to diagnosis.
I propose that a neuroqueer (Grace; Monje; Walker; Yergeau) approach here 
constitutes a theoretical as well as a personal intervention into the circuits of 
diagnosis, disclosure, and accommodation that enframe and contain disability as a 
problem in the academy, that indeed construct the disabled scholar themselves as 
an embodied problem. This is the root of my own hesitation to formally disclose 
and the source of much of the friction that others experience as well: I do not see 
myself as a problem, nor my support needs as evidence of any deficit of my own, 
and I resist the system that requires me to speak of myself in these ways. This resis-
tance is personal, but it can address structural issues. Disability theorist Tobin 
Siebers argues, “Identities, narratives, and experiences based on disability have the 
status of theory because they represent locations and forms of embodiment from 
which the dominant ideologies of society become visible and open to criticism” 
(Disability Theory 14). Neuroqueer approaches foreground an identity-first frame-
work that posits, in the primary case, autism as a mode of neurological difference 
inseparable from the “person” receiving the diagnosis, so: “I am autistic,” instead of 
“I am a person with autism,” or, worse, “I suffer from autism.” Lydia X. Z. Brown 
explains the distinction: “when people say ‘person with autism,’ it does have an atti-
tudinal nuance. It suggests that the person can be  separated  from autism, which 
simply isn’t true” (“Person-First”). Conceptions of neurodivergence and neurodi-
versity, and neuroqueer identities, are based first and foremost in a rejection of the 
framing of disability as a tragedy that has befallen an otherwise “normal” person, 
and an insistence, precisely, on disability as an identity. This autobiographical act is 
consequential and political.
From this primary claiming of disability as a core identity follow several fur-
ther rhetorical and political moves that sharply contradict the purported aims and 
daily practices of university accommodations regimes: a framing of autism as an 
identity that is experienced as impairing only in social contexts that are insufficient-
ly supportive or inclusive; an assertion of autistic culture and autistic community as 
the grounds for political action rooted in self-advocacy; and a rejection of the med-
ical model of disability, and medical authority in general, through support for the 
self-diagnosis movement. I am describing, of course, identity politics: a mode of 
organization, inquiry, critique, and contestation that is both (auto)biographical and 
structural at once.3 Linda Alcoff proposes the centrality of identity politics in both 
naming and countering class-based oppressions, noting that “the denial of equal 
status is organized around and justified on the basis of identity,” and, further, that 
oppressed groups including white women and people of color “are not denied 
equality because we are seen one by one as deficient, but because our group status is 
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interpreted as deficient” (261; emphasis added). Thus, Alcoff asserts that “identi-
ty-based organizing is one way, and sometimes the only way, to mobilize and frame 
demands for redistribution” of resources (260). 
In the argument that follows, then, I am in the first instance here speaking with 
the tools that the concept and scholarship of “neuroqueer” identity and practice 
make available. That is, “neuroqueer” has heuristic value in deconstructing the 
biographic mediation of faculty disability in accommodations regimes. At the same 
time, I am speaking through and as neuroqueerness: I am autistic, and I have 
ADHD, and I identify as neuroqueer. Consequently, my politics are here insepara-
ble from the personal. For Siebers, “[d]isability identities, because of their lack of 
fit, serve as critical frameworks for identifying and questioning the complicated 
ideologies on which social injustice and oppression depend” (Disability Studies 
105). In producing my self-narrative as neuroqueer I put myself as a disabled facul-
ty member into a necessarily critical relationship with the accommodations bureau-
cracy—at my own university—that wishes to write a different story of who I am. 
As Tara Wood suggests, “when the identity you want to perform does not cohere 
with the expected dominant narrative, trouble can ensue” (75), rattling both the 
subject whose identity is nonnormative and the system this identity implicitly cri-
tiques simply by asserting itself. This paper, then, is part of that trouble.
Moral Panic and Academic Ableism
We are in the throes of an epidemic of disability, apparently. There are huge increas-
es in the incidence (of diagnoses) of mental disabilities, including mental illness, 
learning disabilities, and neurodivergence among university-aged populations (e.g., 
Borrell; Catañeda; Cox and South; Gil; Wong). Campus counselling centers groan 
under the weight of student depression and anxiety, unable to meet demand, even 
as buckets of money are thrown at the problem (e.g., Cribb and Ovid; Hutchins; 
Lightfoot). New academic buildings far exceed allocated budgets of money and 
time in order to meet exacting new standards related to physical accessibility. Old 
buildings are subject to disfiguring and expensive retrofits to achieve the same ends 
(e.g., Bovée-Begun; Currie; Dolmage, “Steep Steps”; Girard; Kao; Lang). Students 
manifest fragility in unprecedented ways and numbers, demanding safe spaces and 
trigger warnings (e.g., Grinberg; Lukianoff and Haidt; Paresky; Parke; Pickett; 
Schlosser). Faculty members are buried under cryptic formal requirements for stu-
dent accommodations related to class attendance, group work, exams, and dead-
lines of all sorts (e.g., Hornstein). Advocacy for intellectually disabled university 
students and others deemed unfit for higher education makes a mockery of every-
thing the university is supposed to do and represent (e.g., Bieman; Cunningham; 
Spencer). Or perhaps not. Nicole Brown and Jennifer Leigh find in their research, 
instead of an overwhelming increase in disabled people in higher education, “a stark 
under-representation of disabilities, chronic conditions, invisible illnesses and 
neurodiversity amongst academic staff ” relative to their occurrence in the general 
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population (1; emphasis added). We are thus perhaps suffering from a moral panic 
rather than an epidemic of disability, a panic that posits “disability” and disabled 
people as a threat to the mission and values of higher education (Cohen; Hall and 
Critcher). 
But why? Jay Dolmage demonstrates that what he terms “academic ableism” 
is—philosophically, materially, pragmatically—at the core of the modern project 
of formal higher education. The university as an educational institution, postindus-
trial workplace, site of cultural reproduction, and exemplar of intellectual achieve-
ment is fundamentally, intrinsically ableist not as a side effect of how it is conceived 
or organized, but as a core value. For Dolmage, “the university has been constructed 
as a place for the very able,” a series of arduous trials that “only the truly ‘fit’ survive” 
(Academic Ableism 44). He describes institutions of higher learning as ideologically 
as well as architecturally marked by “steep steps” and gates: the university exists at a 
remove and at a height above the everyday world. Aspirants to the institution must 
be measured worthy by some test of ability, deemed to be able both physically and 
intellectually to climb the “steep steps” of the buildings and curricula alike, inde-
pendently and on their own merit (44). Dolmage concludes, “There is a fear of the 
presence of disability and a desire for its opposite. . . . The self or selves that have 
been projected upon the space of the university are not just able-bodied and nor-
mal, but exceptional, elite” (45). Brown and Leigh find that academic “ableism is 
internalized, normalized and ingrained to such an extent that being ‘normal or 
non-disabled’ is no longer sufficient” (2). The university positions itself as a bastion 
of excellence where, they conclude, “transhumanist hyper-normative enhancement 
is becoming a new normal” (2). Frustrated and stymied by her own institution’s 
accommodations bureaucracy, disabled scholar Kate Kaul considers that “instruc-
tors with disabilities don’t make sense to the university, because its conception of 
disability doesn’t make sense—and . . . this failure to make sense—this 
uncountability—demonstrates the sadly unsurprising disaster of disability policy” 
(179). Ultimately, the incommensurability of cultural understandings of “the uni-
versity” and “disability” that results in this unsurprising disaster of (non)
accommodation reveals a substantive and unresolved ideological conflict: how can 
the university accommodate disability when everything about it is built on the 
exclusion of anything and anyone less than “super-capable”? 
By asking for anything at all, then, disabled academics are always already asking 
for too much, being unreasonable, asking the university to act against its own 
long-established interests and practices, against itself. The accommodation of dis-
abled scholars, who need “special arrangements” in order to participate, argues Jim 
Swan, comes into “conflict with traditional beliefs in the academy about individual 
work, standardization of skills, and fairness (conceptualized as sameness)” (299). 
So tightly held are these ideals that “inclusion can very quickly trigger cries of 
reverse discrimination, exclusion, or injury from the seemingly displaced group 
that identifies itself as the norm” (Swan 300). A request for retrofit wheelchair 
ramps into a building foregrounds the differential, consequential embodiments of 
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students and faculty in an institution that prefers to consider itself a bastion of pure 
intellect. A request to slow the timeline of a tenure review imperils the cherished 
notion that rigor is demonstrated through overwork and suffering, that excellence 
can be measured against the clock. A request for regular administrative or research 
support threatens the winner-take-all competition for research funding as well as 
the cherished notion of the researcher as an individual genius working alone. 
According to Margaret Price, such modifications present “not simply a quantitative 
difference in time, but a qualitative shift of the competitive structure” of faculty 
work and assessment (108). Pure reason, competitive assessments of merit, and 
the cult of overwork are central to the university’s self-image. Thus, the university is 
depicted as necessarily struggling to manage legal requirements to accommodate 
disability at the same time as it defends itself against what it sees as excessive finan-
cial entailments or existential threat: this is the source of the moral panic around 
disability in higher education. 
This moral panic is held back by the multisite, multistep paperwork of the 
accommodations bureaucracy. As Siebers expresses it, “The ideology of ability 
simultaneously banishes disability and turns it into a principle of exclusion” (Dis-
ability Theory 9). As this exclusion is now forbidden by law, a kind of intellectual 
cleaving, or double-consciousness, is required to both “accommodate” disability to 
the satisfaction of legal duty, and, crucially, maintain the (ableist) ideology of com-
petitive ability in order to maintain internal coherence. This cleavage is partially 
achieved by medicalizing disability. Siebers explains: 
The sharp difference between disability and ability may be grasped superficially in 
the idea that disability is essentially a “medical matter,” while ability concerns nat-
ural gifts, talents, intelligence, creativity, physical prowess, imagination, dedica-
tion, the eagerness to strive, including the capacity and desire to strive—in brief, 
the essence of the human spirit. (Disability Theory 9)
University accommodations bureaucracies proceduralize a series of biographic 
mediations that split disabled people in two, differentiating disability and ability: 
an illness, diagnosis, impairment, deficit, or lack that can be “accommodated” for-
mally on the one hand, and, on the other, an underlying, non-disabled person with 
the required, standard (that is to say, superhuman) ability to achieve excellence 
through rigorous and independent self-application in the usual ways. This cleaving 
suits the purposes required by the institution: legal compliance as well as the main-
tenance of the “myth of meritocracy” (Carter et al. 96). At the same time, however, 
these biographic mediations both produce and reinforce disability stigma and 
structural ableism by erasing identifications that may be crucial to scholars’ sense of 
self. Accommodation bureaucracies attract the same critique that all person-first 
framings of disability provoke, namely that disabled people can only be understood 
to be valuable if their disabilities are abstracted away from their personhood.4 That 
is to say, they take away disabled scholars’ agency as autobiographical (disabled) 
selves to suit institutional purposes. This expropriation starts with diagnosis.
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Diagnosis
Diagnosis performs the affirmation of the “realness” of the disability; it produces 
disability in a given instance as a scientific, objective pathological fact. Diagnosis is 
thus a primary site of the biographic mediation of disability, one in which autho-
rized experts translate and transform patient (or parent, or teacher) complaints into 
patient histories into lists of observed and testable impairments into a coherent case 
file that resolves by naming the disorder according to standardized criteria and 
attaching the diagnostic label to the patient, to whom a standardized treatment 
regime can be applied. That is, the diagnosis takes unto itself the power to name 
and to authorize a claim; it is a nexus of both representation and redistribution, and 
thus a site at which power is concentrated. As G. Thomas Couser suggests, “The 
considerable power of the medical profession today depends on the medicalization 
of society and the concomitant granting of a virtual monopoly on diagnosis and 
treatment of illness to trained specialists” (18). This monopoly/medicalization is 
predicated on the suppression/erasure of the subjective, cultural, environmental, 
and interpersonal factors that cannot be swabbed, biopsied, petri-dished, weighed, 
or otherwise measured against a quantifiable standard. The diagnosis is presumed 
to live outside the realm of subjectivity, to provide an objective and disinterested 
categorization which grounds the determination of accommodations that can be 
claimed to meet the legal standard of “reasonable, necessary, and appropriate,” 
because science. 
This is a useful fiction, mostly.
Much of the diagnostic apparatus is deeply interpretive, contingent, and con-
textual; the diagnoses such mediations produce are contingent and radically unsta-
ble, even conceptually. Diagnostic categories and labels are constantly in flux: 
disorders are named, appear, become associated with other diagnoses, are formed 
into (or split apart from) categories, or disappear altogether.5 Diagnostic testing 
instruments and protocols are sometimes radically skewed by gendered and cultur-
al assumptions about how disability manifests.6 The processes of biographic media-
tion that transform the human being flagged as a “weird kid who talks like an adult 
but can’t ride a bike” into a diagnosis of “Autism Spectrum Disorder—Asperger’s 
subtype” is based in stories, rooted in values, solicited through performance, and 
dependent on interpretation of social and personal effects, as I describe above. 
Despite the deliberately clinical framing, diagnosis is often a kind of conflict-ridden 
Procrustean story-making exercise in which disabled people must perform or dis-
guise disability in particular ways to be seen to fit a diagnostic model or category in 
order to achieve some action in the world. Couser suggests that diagnosis is a kind 
of “narrative collaboration” between patient and doctor, but one that is often expe-
rienced less like true co-authorship and more like uncredited ghostwriting, in 
which all traces of the patient’s contributions are erased, subsumed under the pas-
sive voice of medical omniscience and authorized by the narrative authority of the 
medical professional (10). 
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The power to assign, secure, seek, deny, or reject a diagnosis is asymmetrically 
distributed, and the effects of a diagnosis on a disabled person’s life can be deter-
mined by who initiates the process, what its aims are, and whose testimony is given 
most weight.7 Sometimes the putatively disabled person resists diagnosis; some-
times the clinician resists the patient’s search for a diagnosis. In some cases, diagno-
ses are withheld from historically marginalized subjects because of lingering 
pervasive stereotyping. Alternatively, such diagnoses are weaponized against poor 
or racialized children to remove them from mainstream public education. Access to 
diagnosis itself is uneven and unequal: securing or evading diagnosis is often a 
function of the leveraging of privilege, or not. In all cases, to secure a diagnosis, “the 
patient offers up testimony that the doctor interprets according to codes and con-
ventions generally unavailable to the patient” (Couser 10). Diagnosis literally 
rewrites disabled life stories in ways perhaps deliberately incomprehensible to the 
subject it purportedly describes because the diagnosis is not communicating to the 
disabled person, often, but to non-disabled others in gatekeeping roles: teachers, 
insurance companies, human resources departments, etc. The diagnostic process 
performs rituals of scientific objectivity that address anxieties about malingering, 
advantage-seeking, and hysteria that attach particularly to requests for the accom-
modation of invisible disabilities such as mental illness or neurodivergence. The 
authorizing function of a medical diagnosis affixes a label to the “depressive,” or the 
“autistic,” or the “social phobic” academic. It is this label that comes to represent the 
disabled academic qua disabled academic to the institution, and to unlock access to 
resources that have been made to attach to that label. Those who will not or cannot 
secure medical diagnoses remain invisible and unnamed as disabled at the universi-
ty. Diagnosis is the key that unlocks access to accommodations, but first the dis-
abled academic must present themselves at the door—they must disclose.
“Otherwise qualified”: Disclosure and Verification
The disclosure of disability status on a form in some part of some academic bureau-
cracy is a fulcrum upon which disability pivots from a personal matter to an institu-
tional one. In a superb understatement, Brown and Leigh point out that “[t]icking 
the ‘I am disabled’ box is a statement and a commitment” (2). It is a statement of 
identity, of course, but also a statement of claim: a claim of entitlement to resources 
that binds the university to a legal duty of care. It is a commitment to submit oneself 
to the biographic mediation of this identity, so that the claim to duty of care can be 
issued through the precise specification of the extent and bounds of that duty 
(should it be determined as owed to the individual by the institution). To disclose 
a disability is to enter into a new evaluative relationship, not to circumvent it. For 
Lennard Davis, the condition of disability itself provokes coercive demands for dis-
closure: disability, he famously asserts, “always demands an answer” (qtd. in 
Kulick). Don Kulick elaborates that disability “isn’t just a demand for information; 
it is a demand for accountability and responsibility,” and further, that “disability is 
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an accusation” that seeks to assign blame or evade it (20). Although the duty to 
accommodate as prescribed in legislation describes the rights of disabled people to 
equitable treatment in institutional contexts, the process by which academic 
accommodations are secured demonstrates that those rights are not inherent or 
inalienable but contingent on the evaluative judgment of the institution itself, 
which undertakes the role of inquisitor into disability to reveal the putatively objec-
tive truth of disability’s discrete impairing impacts in the workplace. 
Disability disclosures are “issued into a complex representational realm in 
which each person at the other end of disclosure tends to do their best to fit the 
revealed identity into a preexisting matrix of meanings and assumptions” (Samuels, 
“Passing” 17). This preexisting matrix, as we have seen, is shot through with mean-
ings and assumptions predicated on the exclusion of disability and unsound minds. 
The verification process legitimizes but perhaps more importantly limits the schol-
ar’s claim to a given disability diagnosis and rights to accommodation. My own 
institution’s AccessAbility office asserts: “Post-secondary institutions are obligated 
to make reasonable accommodations only to the known limitations of otherwise qual-
ified individuals with disabilities” (“Academic Accommodations” 6; emphasis add-
ed). Certainly, disabled academics describe the narrative effort of pitching their 
stories of disability as a knife edge between performing or producing disability 
“real” enough to qualify for accommodation (“known limitations”), but not so dra-
matic as to render one categorically other and unfit (“otherwise qualified”) (Price 
109). At the same time, verification pathways re-produce disability as a chopped-
up list of deficits, impairments, and problems that are more or less severe, of greater 
or lesser duration, in one or more domains in which the disabled scholar fails to live 
up to normative standards. 
The language on my own institution’s site (it is typical in this regard) makes 
clear that in coming forward to seek accommodations, the disabled scholar is apply-
ing for access to such consideration, and not asserting a recognized right to it (“New 
To”). That is, it is not disclosure of disability that mobilizes resources, but rather its 
verification. Here, the biographic mediations proliferate rapidly, complicating and 
obfuscating disability identities and experiences. As my research assistant Elise Vist 
astutely observed to me, the disclosure and verification paperwork “defies story.” 
There are different requirements (and different forms) for different disabilities. On 
our site, these disability categories include Mental Health/Psychiatric Disabilities; 
Learning Disabilities; ADHD; Sensory, Physical, and Medical Disabilities; and 
Acquired Brain Injury (“Disability Verification”). Each category has different dis-
closure and verification requirements—a diagnosis need not be disclosed for those 
seeking accommodation for Mental Health/Psychiatric Disabilities, while it is 
required for ADHD, which, indeed, constitutes its own category-of-one diagnosis. 
Scholars claiming mental health or psychiatric disability may be required to comply 
with medication treatment in order to access accommodations; those with ADHD 
may have their accommodations taken away if their own medication treatment 
succeeds. A family doctor can certify a “mental wellness illness,” but a 
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neuropsychologist or other specialist is required for Learning Disabilities. There 
seems to be no rhyme or reason to the types of disclosure requirements, the profes-
sionals empowered to author the verification forms, or the language around dura-
tion or type of impairment.8 
What each category does have in common, though, is a set of paperwork 
requirements that are numerous, lengthy, and deeply invasive. For scholar Susan 
Ghiaciuc, “the documentation I was required to provide once I disclosed my dis-
ability made me feel that I was being forced to put my various symptoms on display 
for public examination” in ways that lead her to conclude that many academics 
would choose to go unaccommodated rather than submit to this type of evaluative 
exposure (Kerschbaum et al.). I can see why. The ADHD verification form at my 
institution is seven pages long (“Verification of ADHD”). Only one of these pages 
is filled out by the applicant, and their input consists of providing contact informa-
tion as well as consent for the university to access private medical information now 
and any time in the future, should the accommodations or the need for them come 
into question. The next three pages must be filled out by a registered medical pro-
fessional. These require the naming and dating of primary and secondary diagnoses 
and ultimately the “certification” of the student’s disability status. This includes dis-
closing any and all medications taken as well as dosages and timing. In between, 
however, come detailed checklists about various kinds and severity of inattention, 
hyperactivity, and impulsivity, questions that would seem best answered by the dis-
abled student themselves, who, as this form is constituted, is not the trusted narra-
tor of their own disability.
For Kaul, the rituals of scientific objectivity performed in disclosure and veri-
fication fundamentally misunderstand disability. The idea that everyone would dis-
close “if we felt safe, if it was in our best interests, if the costs were not too high, 
suggests an underlying truth one has access to: an uncovering, with non-disclosure 
as a covering of that truth” (Kaul 173). Instead, the story of academic disability is 
much more nuanced and contextual, sometimes strategic but always reflexively 
autobiographical in ways that lists of impairments and dates of diagnoses can never 
convey. Poet and graduate student Joanne Limburg thus writes of having to con-
vince an accommodations officer at her university that her autism diagnosis was 
not in error, and that she was entitled to academic accommodation. Limburg 
describes the cognitive dissonance experienced by the university staff member 
assigned to verify her case, whom she describes as visibly flummoxed during her 
intake interview, unable to square an autism diagnostic report with the fact of the 
woman in front of him (146). Limburg experiences a strange inversion, whereby 
instead of trying to quash her more autistic inclinations in the hopes of fitting in, 
she found herself trying to find a way to “be more autistic” in order to secure 
accommodations. She describes a kind of intrapersonal split: a “Self A,” the unself-
consciously unmediated autistic self who has always been out of step socially with 
her peers, and the “Self B” she developed by dint of hard effort to pass as normal to 
be able to move through the world. Whereas it was Self B who had to prove 
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competence and excellence in order to be admitted to the PhD program, in order to 
receive needed accommodations, Limburg writes “I let Self B rat on Self A” (146). 
Limburg is caught precisely in the double bind of having to demonstrate visibly her 
“known limitations” by consciously loosening the mask that allowed her to present 
as “otherwise qualified” for admission to the institution from which she requires 
accommodation. Further complicating the issue, Limburg admits that after spend-
ing a lifetime developing Self B precisely in order to manage and suppress Self A, 
she’s not sure they are really distinct anymore: “acting autistic” in ways the assessor 
requires in order to approve her need for support is just that—an act. I experienced 
a similar difficulty in my own psychoeducational assessment: praised for my 
turn-taking, modulated vocal tone, relaxed posture, and eye contact, I found myself 
having to explain to the psychologist the various algorithms and rubrics I set up to 
guide these kinds of interactions in order to appear “normal.” Even in actively seek-
ing a diagnosis, I was nearly unable to stop my “look normal” programs from 
running. 
Auto/biographical stories such as these raise important questions around the 
nature and impact of disability. Is it still autism if Limburg and I and so many other 
women can “control” it? Is it still ADHD if I am experiencing therapeutic effects 
from pharmacological treatment? Is it still autism if we “seem” normal to others but 
at the cost of great psychic, emotional, or physical effort, even if these efforts are 
reflexive, habitual, and hard to undo? These questions show the poverty of academ-
ic verification processes that rely nearly entirely on external observations and 
reports aiming to reveal an objective and stable truth of disability. The truth is, as so 
many disabled people have attested, that there is no one truth of disability: disability 
identity is thoroughgoing and pervasive, personal and autobiographical, and 
context-dependent and extra-discursive all at once. If you asked us, we could tell 
you what we need, and in what circumstances. Disability “verification” processes 
are rooted, however, in mistrust enacted in the suppression or dismissal of disabled 
people’s self-reports and self-understanding. The biographic mediations undertak-
en by verification are thus, structurally, at once profoundly pathologizing and 
deeply un-autobiographical. The process seems designed to be humiliating, labori-
ous, and paternalistic by turns. It is, also, depressing. Verification, as well as diagno-
sis, is deeply committed to framing disability in the deficit model. The forms wish 
to certify exactly how the disabled applicant is nonfunctional, limited, impaired, or 
otherwise unable: paradoxically, you only have rights if you’re wrong.
Accommodation
A “list of eligible accommodations” will be loosed after a disability disclosure is 
verified and translated into a set of functional limitations and legal obligations—
until the scholar is themselves deemed “eligible” to see it, the list remains a secret. 
For faculty members at my institution, currently guided by no explicit formal 
policy or process, any eligible accommodations are even more obscure as they are 
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determined and enacted in the most local circumstances: there is not even a list. 
Overall, however, from such documentation for students as I could find, it seems 
clear that the kinds and number of accommodations offered in no way match the 
level of detail that verification demands, nor show evidence of attention to the sup-
port needs of an individual person, rather than the deficits attached to an individual 
diagnosis. Physical disabilities are accommodated through hardware, software, and 
infrastructure—large-print notes, movement of a course section to an accessible 
classroom, braille conversion, speech-to-text editors, recordings and amplification 
of lectures—assistive technologies addressing a wide variety of specific physical or 
sensory barriers. However, for anything other than physical impairments the fol-
lowing accommodations are nearly universally offered, as the sum total of possibil-
ity: volunteer note-taker; extra time on exams; time shifting on exams; separate 
location for exams; reduced course load.9 For all the astonishing volume and gran-
ularity of personal and private information required for verification, a remarkably 
short and unimaginative list of accommodations is produced at the end of it. Dis-
closure and verification compel baroquely ornamented biographic mediations of 
disability that constitute an arduous trial for the sake of its own arduousness: the 
point seems to be to make it very difficult to qualify for an accommodation of any 
sort, rather than to provide a ground for the elaboration of similarly detailed and 
personal accommodation plans. 
The accommodation of students seems geared to meet the minimum stan-
dards of the law without provoking faculty revolt over undue or unfair “special 
treatment.” That is, the granted accommodations themselves constitute an act of 
containment limiting disability’s impact on the classroom, the curriculum, and the 
academic schedule; they require faculty assent in the framework of academic free-
dom over curriculum and teaching (Gillies). At my own institution, the “Accom-
modation Resource Guide for Instructors” is a fifteen-page table that names and 
describes each accommodation, and then devotes two fulsome columns to assert-
ing faculty autonomy and describing AccessAbility’s stringent vetting guidelines 
(“Accommodation Resource”). A further web resource, “Accessibility Tips,” locat-
ed in the Faculty section of the site, lists eleven different types of potential student 
disability and devotes a page to each of these types, each page then describing 
exactly what each disability consists of and listing possible accommodations. For 
each of the eleven types of disability, nearly the same accommodations are 
described. Once more, the hairsplitting and multiplication of pathways through 
diagnosis and verification and the personalization of the “list of eligible accommo-
dations” seems geared not to individualize accommodations, but to demonstrate 
the rigor and objectivity of the verification process—that is, to assuage the moral 
panic around disability’s threat to core academic values of individual merit and 
excellence, as demonstrated through competition, hierarchical assessment, timed 
trials, and normative overwork.
We see such panic among faculty even when addressing the question of dis-
ability among the professoriate. In January 2012, the Association of American 
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University Professors (AAUP) released a report on faculty disability that devoted 
two pages of nine to asserting the need to evaluate all faculty on identical perfor-
mance measures, regardless of ability status; to listing and denouncing “unreason-
able” accommodation requests; and to outlining grounds for dismissing disabled 
faculty. One of its three appendices lays out the legal justifications and jeopardies of 
these dismissals. The report itself was prompted by a request for the organization to 
review an earlier policy, Regulation 4(e), “Termination Because of Physical and 
Mental Disability,” which gives some idea where they were starting from. Notably, 
while the document itself is titled “Accommodating Faculty Members Who Have 
Disabilities,” the accompanying press release of February 2012 is headlined, by 
contrast, “Rights and Responsibilities of Faculty Members Who Have Disabilities,” 
seemingly walking back its very mild assertion of faculty rights to assert a set of 
responsibilities and accountabilities attached to these (italics added). It is difficult 
to read this document and imagine that it was written by an organization devoted 
to securing and maintaining faculty rights in the academic workplace. The legalistic 
emphasis on essential duties, responsibility and duty of individual faculty members 
to disclose, need for verification, and continued focus on excellence according to 
fixed standards of productivity very much echo—rather than contest—the moral 
panic around disability witnessed in institutional responses to student disability. 
For Craig Meyer, the main issue with the report is that it “focuses on what fac-
ulty members must do to be considered equal instead of on what they are able to 
do. The result is that disabled faculty members are confined by and often must 
defend their disability instead of being free to utilize it” (Kerschbaum et al.). Meyer 
is among a group of disabilities studies scholars who collectively authored a 
response to the AAUP report in the Modern Languages Association’s Profession 
journal. The polyvocality, nuance, and specificity of the individual pieces that make 
up this collective response are remarkable, a model of what a disability-inclusive 
understanding of access—rather than accommodation—might make possible.
(Auto)biographic Mediation
Telling—or retelling, or reframing—stories about the self is essential to claiming a 
disability identity, but such stories collide uncomfortably with dominant rhetoric. 
“For me to speak,” writes Stephanie Kerschbaum, “means being able to imagine 
audiences who can respond to me in ways that open up, rather than circumscribe, 
possibilities” (69). The biographic mediation of disability identity in higher educa-
tion, however, seems designed to circumscribe possibilities. Systems of diagnosis, 
disclosure, and accommodation rewrite, reframe, and sometimes embargo disabled 
life narrative by requiring framing in medical discourse authorized by medical pro-
fessionals, reducing disabled academics to their diagnostic labels, and shrouding 
the provision of accommodation in secrecy-framed-as-privacy that hides the dis-
abled person from view as much as the disability itself. Weighing the possible rami-
fications of sharing the story of her own disability, then, Kerschbaum worries: “Will 
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I have my story told back to me in a narrative I do not recognize as mine?” (67). 
Yes: our stories are told back to us as lists of “functional limitations,” “eligible 
accommodations,” and “essential duties,” with our very presence in the workplace 
always threatening to produce “undue hardship” for those around us. The 
biographic mediation of disability in accommodations bureaucracies compels the 
disclosure of medical and personal information from disabled scholars to be turned 
into listicles of discrete impairments by non-disabled people for other non-disabled 
people. Nearly everyone except the disabled scholar is empowered to speak with 
authority about disability in the academy. Disability is at the center of these narra-
tive acts; disabled people are erased as agents or rhetors in—and audiences for—
such acts. 
But how might disabled academics regain agency over their own stories? “Per-
sonal narrative,” Couser suggests, “is an increasingly popular way of resisting or 
reversing the process of depersonalization that often accompanies illness—the 
expropriation of experience by an alien and alienating discourse” (22). At the same 
time, personal narratives of disability can repersonalize one’s experience of 
subjectivity in relation to others, one’s autobiographical sense. Limburg, for exam-
ple, describes rescripting her life story—her “autiebiography”—following her mid-
life autism diagnosis: “After diagnosis, the language I used to talk about myself 
began to change, and with this new kind of talking, it could be said that I was calling 
a new identity into being,” for example by renaming as “stimming” a set of daily 
behaviors she used to describe to herself simply as “fidgeting” (149). This frame 
could retroactively be applied to her auto/biographical understanding over a lon-
ger period: “As the person I was changed, so did the child I had been” (149). On the 
whole, autistic and other neurodivergent people telling their stories online experi-
ence this rescripting as powerfully self-affirming. Having always understood them-
selves to be very different from those around them, with that difference seen as 
somehow wrong or the mark of lack of effort or character, to know that their mode 
of difference is fundamental, pervasive, and not unique to themselves can release 
burdens of shame. There can be, even, a kind of giddiness to this. 
What might seem like a blessing—the ability to “pass” as neurotypical—can 
be experienced as exhausting, alienating, and “traumatic,” especially when the ulti-
mate “impossibility of passing as normal” without self-erasure becomes apparent 
(Alshammari 31). The new frame for self-understanding offered by the diagnosis 
and the acknowledgment of fundamental and consequential differences in how 
autistic people and non-autistic people experience the world means that someone 
who has always, for example, stressed herself into daily headaches trying to infer 
people’s feelings from facial expressions that are inscrutable to her may decide that 
it’s okay now to just say “I can’t tell what you’re feeling; can you explain it to me?” 
This may appear to others as a new “autism” behavior that did not exist prior to the 
excuse offered by a diagnosis, but what has happened is that the autistic person sim-
ply stops masking a secret deficit they (me) had been expending enormous mental 
resources on pretending—and often failing—to be good at. Most autistic people, 
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then, describe coming into their disability identity as permitting them to release 
the efforts employed in masking, skills highly developed enough to see them 
through to adulthood without being flagged for diagnosis by others.10 One of the 
reasons that I resist seeking academic accommodation is that the process itself once 
more tries to split me into an “otherwise qualified” putatively normal person and a 
tragic sufferer of the external impairments of autism and ADHD that are not me. 
Academic accommodations aim to mask and camouflage the impairing elements of 
my disability to allow me to pass as a “normal” academic. But I’ve been doing that 
my whole life, and the efforts are only ever sometimes and partially successful, and 
they are always and completely exhausting and demoralizing. Autistic advocates 
have begun to interrogate the social work and social violence this type of “masking” 
enacts on us. We want less masking, not more. The hashtag campaign #TakeThe-
MaskOff notably encourages such acts of “being extra autistic” as necessary self-
care (Rose, “#TakeTheMaskOff ”). Diagnoses or self-identifications, then, open 
space for a new understanding of a self that is different in some thoroughgoing way 
without being wrong. 
The thorough autobiographical imbrication of “core” self and “diagnosis” also 
works to chip away at the power of the objectifying and categorizing gaze that seeks 
to attack (pace Couser) the “disorder” in favor of a more nuanced and personal 
auto/biographical understanding of this disabled/self. Neuroqueerness thus offers 
an opening for disabled counternarrative. The autistic self-advocacy movement is 
notable in this regard—challenging the ableism of functioning labels, querying the 
financial and cultural inaccessibility of diagnosis, holding formal medicine to 
account for its eugenic thinking in the cure model, supporting self-diagnosis, orga-
nizing autistic-only conferences, hashtags, and Facebook groups, and rallying 
under the banner of “nothing about us without us.” Acts of resistance are produced 
in daily acts of life writing in blogs, Facebook groups, collective hashtags on Twit-
ter, and, crucially, in the #Self DXisValid (“self-diagnosis is valid”) movement that 
removes medical professionals entirely from the equation.11 Other hashtag move-
ments consider sophisticated intersections between race and disability, and 
between competing notions of “severe” or “mild” impairment, attuned to the indi-
viduality of presentation as well as the opportunity for group identity. These 
include #ActuallyAutistic (“ActuallyAutistic”), #AutisticWhileBlack (founded by 
Karima Cevik), and #DoILookAutisticYet (founded by Hannah Quinton).12 At 
least one tag is geared to educating allistic people: #AskingAutistics (founded by 
Christa Holmans)13 is an open forum to access autistic people’s experiences and 
expertise. In all of these narratives, the disabled self is understood as a material set 
of affordances and constraints, as well as socially determined and environmentally 
and contextually sensitive, produced and contested through any number of inter-
personal and institutional biographic mediations. 
Disabled academics who adopt a proactive disability identity expose the ideo-
logical underpinnings (charity, paternalism, pathologization, a drive toward nor-
mativity understood to cluster at the center of the bell curve) of accommodations 
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regimes by refusing to accede to the biographic mediations these regimes exact: 
formal diagnosis as objective label; privacy and implied shame; presumption that 
the disabled person (“person with a disability”) is not competent to determine 
their own support needs (“accommodations”). Academics who adopt identity-first 
language, a shorthand for the full integration of the “disability” with the “person” 
begin from the premise that they are not problems to be fixed. Disability scholar 
and disabled academic Kayla Besse exemplifies this mindset in her Twitter profile 
description: “Anything you can do I can do . . . but slower and with greater profi-
ciency” (@kayla_besse). Such matter-of-fact claims of disability identity alongside 
assertions of competence ought not to be surprising, but they are. Such acts can 
also produce an inclusive and expansive set of positive and empowering identifica-
tions, rich in detail, that can anchor historically excluded subjects within a commu-
nity. That is, they can form the grounds for identity politics.14 This combination of 
greater self-knowledge, self-acceptance, and sense of self in a minoritized commu-
nity is dangerous to the maintenance of the academic ableism that undergirds the 
university as institution. Crucially, I begin to recognize that my own specific kinds 
of differences place me in a community of others, at the same time as an emergent 
sense of broader disability communities, each with its own set of differences oper-
ating structurally and intersectionally, offers the opportunity for profound political 
identifications and activism. From an emergent positive self-identification and a 
structural awareness of pervasive ableism, I have become a good deal more willing 
to be unreasonable in my claim to accessible academic spaces and to make such 
claims on behalf of other disabled scholars as well. For Brenda Brueggermann, life 
narrative is crucial to this project: “Together we must make, create, and model sto-
ries of successful avenues of access in the academy, and on our team should be 
those of us on crip time working to help those in normate tempo create syncopated 
rhythms, jazzy stories. We don’t necessarily have to follow that [normate] beat. We 
are the drummers” (Kerschbaum et al.).
Conclusion: A Culture of Access
In the context of the academy as an institution and a workplace, disability is always 
either a threat or a crisis—or both. Bureaucratic, legal, and medical regimes of diag-
nosis, disclosure, and accommodation constitute a series of biographic mediations 
that suppress the critical and revolutionary potential of disability identity and com-
munity by ensnaring disabled scholars in formal processes designed to adhere to 
legal requirements without altering the essentially ableist character of higher edu-
cation. Where neuroqueerness incorporates pervasive differences in our orienta-
tion to the world as a key element of our self-concept and identity, accommodations 
bureaucracies construct disability as a set of impairments that must be mitigated to 
return us to a baseline “normal” condition in order to participate in the academic 
project. Accommodations bureaucracies rhetorically sever the disability from the 
person through their use of person-first language; they also materialize this fracture 
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by addressing accommodations only to a diagnosis, a process that many disabled 
scholars find dehumanizing, patronizing, and ineffective. Access laws have had and 
continue to have many salutary practical effects but also provide a set of terms, con-
cepts, and narratives that continue to pathologize disability and difference, and to 
frame it as other. For Dolmage, the “social construction of disability on campus . . . 
mandates that disability exist only as a negative, private individual failure” (56). 
That is, the biographic process roots the “problem” of disability in the individual 
bodymind of the accommodated scholar. Increasingly, disabled scholars resist both 
this framing of themselves as problems and its simultaneous injunction to silence 
and privacy. In claiming control of their (our) own (auto)biographies, disabled 
subjects actively contest the various institutional biographic mediations that shape 
our relations to the institution in terms of undue hardship, functional limitation, 
and minimum legal duty. Angela M. Carter describes her own experience in a way 
that captures both the frustrations and possibilities of claiming disability identity 
through reclamation of the story of disability: “Disclosing never ends,” she writes, 
and also, “I went from never wanting to disclose and feeling really horrible when I 
had to, to now feeling like it is imperative to my survival and my politics—even if I 
often still hesitate before doing so” (Carter et al. 103). The claiming of disability 
identity and a commitment to disability community, broadly construed, produces 
more radical demands than the medical model of impairment and the administra-
tive model of functional limitation ever could—a more holistic vision of rebuilding 
higher education to support access, instead of the private and individual retrofit of 
accommodation.
Notes
1. Here I am on a nationally broadcast and podcast technology and culture radio 
program talking about online authenticity and my own autism community online 
(text and audio available): https://www.cbc.ca/radio/spark/it-s-okay-to-cry-
on-instagram-1.4915326 (Young). 
2. The joke’s on her—my particular flavor of autism means I’m weird enough to have to 
fake normal, but skilled enough to manage it if I ride censor on myself constantly so 
I’m never not self-conscious. Ha, ha.
3. Important to say: although it has been taken up widely, extensively, and to different 
purposes, identity politics as a theory and praxis is brought to us by the Combahee 
River Collective (“Statement”).
4. Obviously, there is a complicated and rich history to person-first language. See C. L. 
Lynch for a cogent and useful Twitter thread explainer (CLLynch).
5. Until distressingly recently, “homosexuality” was considered a form of mental illness. 
ADHD was for a very long time considered to be solely a disorder of childhood 
(Gentile et al.). Asperger’s syndrome used to be a different diagnosis than autism, but 
now both are conflated under the umbrella of “autism spectrum disorder” in ways that 
many (former) Aspergians resist because they really liked being considered “high 
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functioning” and “not like those other autistic people,” and again that’s not about 
science but about social hierarchy, ableism, and supremacy (see Shaber for an 
explanation of Shiny Aspies and Aspie Supremacists).
6. Women have long been underdiagnosed for mental disabilities like ASD and ADHD 
because their presentation of symptoms often differs from the men for whom the tests 
were designed—they are diagnosed overwhelmingly with mood disorders instead 
(Bejerot et al.; Craft; Devlin; Krahn and Fenton; Lindsmith; Piper; Ridley). Race is a 
clear confounding factor in diagnosis of neurological difference as well (Brown, All 
The Weight; Cevik; Mandell et al.; Shogren et al.; Tincani et al.; Travers et al.; Travers 
and Krezmien).
7. It is well-know that women are more likely than men to have their pain discounted by 
physicians in emergency rooms, even in dire crises such as in ovarian torsion, as these 
women are considered to be unreliable narrators (see Barker; Bodenner; Hoffman and 
Tarzian; Werner and Malterud; Wheaton). African Americans have their pain 
undertreated for a different reason: a longstanding cultural belief, even among 
physicians, that African Americans do not feel pain like White people do (see 
Hoffman et al.; Kempner; Pryma; Trawalter et al.).
8. Nor even what constitutes a category: when I was first reading all these pages, there 
was a form specific to autism—in the interim, that form seems to have disappeared, 
and autism as a separate category of disability has disappeared from the verification 
page.
9. This is not what we meant when we wanted crip time to be acknowledged 
(McDonald; Samuels, “Six Ways”).
10. On masking and camouflaging, particularly in women, see Hull et al.; Holmans; Lai et 
al.; and Wiskerke et al. For the psychic costs of such practices, see Boren, “Austistic 
Burnout”; and Rose, “How to Hide Your Autism” and “Autistic Burnout.” For the 
general case, see Siebers, “Disability as Masquerade.”
11. For why this removal is felt as an urgent need, see #DoctorsAreDickheads on Twitter, 
founded by Stevie Boebi (Stephens), and with a representative and widely shared 
thread by Jennifer Brea.
12. See Oliphant.
13. See Rose, “Parents.”
14. Importantly, here, a caveat: identity-first activism is not a uniform practice, politics, or 
identity among disabled people. Many disavow the label of disability entirely. Some, 
though, are pushed toward disability identifications by their own experiences of the 
alienation of the accommodations bureaucracies. Kleege describes a student with 
access needs who did not consider herself to be disabled, but who, over the course of 
several frustrating semesters of navigating the system, came into a political disability 
identification that moved her toward disability activism as well as identity. Not all 
disabled people have to adopt identify-first understandings of their disability, or to 
adopt neuroqueer self-understandings and theories in order for all disabled people to 
benefit from the activism of those who do. 
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